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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for trafficking in firearms
15 results foundAuthor: Florquin, Nicolas Title: "A House Isn't A Home Without A Gun": SALW Survey, Republic of Montenegro Summary: The uncontrolled proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons (SALW) is a serious problem in South Eastern Europe. SALW proliferation has fuelled crime and insecurity, exacerbating conflict in the region and undermining post conflict peace-building. Problems related to SALW are likely to pose a serious constraint to economic and social development in South Eastern Europe. This SALW Survey examines the small arms situation in the Republic of Montenegro and seeks to shed light on the specifics surrounding a number of issues, including: firearms possession by both civilians and the government, the quantifiable impacts of weapons on Montenegro, perceptions about weapons in society, and the potential capacity of the government for future SALW control and weapon collection programmes. This study, commissioned by the UNDP and SEESAC, is designed particularly to inform a proposed SALW Control program to occur in Montenegro in 2004 and thus, provides a background for assessing the feasibility of collecting weapons in Montenegro. Details: Belgrade: SEESAC (South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons; Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2004. 53p. Source: Internet Resource Year: 2004 Country: Serbia and Montenegro URL: Shelf Number: 119427 Keywords: Firearms and CrimeGunsTrafficking in FirearmsWeapons |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Title: An Asessment of Transnational Organized Crime in Central Asia Summary: Transnational organized crime in Central Asia represents a serious threat to the region inhibiting the emergence of stable societies. This report provides an overview of the scope of the problem of transnational organized crime in Central Asia. The report identifies trafficking in drugs, human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption as the principle and most serious crimes in the Central Asian region. It provides an analytical framework based on causal factors as well as on facilitating and inhibiting factors. Acknowledging the difficulties and limitations associated with research on organized crime in Central Asia, the report is a synthesis of information from a multitude of sources. It includes information provided by the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan together with data and information drawn from secondary literature, expert opinions and other sources. An analysis of organized crime in Central Asia must take into account historical, political, social and economic developments in the region. Most states in Central Asia are in a transitional period and are characterized by developing, but still relatively low levels of effective governance. Gaps in governmental capacity and voids created by weak and ineffective state institutions are a strong contributing factor in the proliferation of organized criminal activities. Moreover, cultural, religious and ethnic differences are exploited by organized criminals to achieve their objectives and to facilitate the spread of organized crime. Organized crime, therefore, must be seen as a consequence of the interplay between these various elements. The report discusses the specific structures and modes of operation of the Central Asian criminal groups. It highlights the diversity of those groups and the tendency towards more flexible network organizations. Various types of activities in which criminal groups are engaged are explored in the report, with drug trafficking presenting the most serious problem. With three of the Central Asian states, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, sharing borders with Afghanistan, the largest producer of illicit opiates in the world, Central Asia is an important transit zone for illicit drugs. A consequence of the drug trafficking has been a major increase in drug abuse in the region. However, it is not the only form of criminal activity associated with organized crime in the region. Organized crime activity includes significant—and in some cases growing—incidents of trafficking in human beings and firearms, fraud and corruption. Details: New York: UNODC, 2007. 57p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 9, 2010 at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf Year: 2007 Country: Asia URL: http://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/Central_Asia_Crime_Assessment.pdf Shelf Number: 116541 Keywords: CorruptionDrug TraffickingFraudHuman TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Eguizabal, Cristina Title: Crime and Violence in Central America's Northern Triangle: How U.S. Policy Responses are Helping, Hurting, and Can Be Improved Summary: Throughout the spring and summer of 2014, a wave of unaccompanied minors and families from Central America began arriving at the U.S.-Mexican border in record numbers. During June and July over 10,000 a month were arriving. The unexpected influx triggered a national debate about immigration and border policy, as well as an examination of the factors compelling thousands of children to undertake such a treacherous journey. Approximately two-thirds of these children are from Central America's Northern Triangle-El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. According to interviews with the children their motives for migrating ranged from fleeing some of the world's highest homicide rates, rampant extortion, communities controlled by youth gangs, domestic violence, impunity for most crimes, as well as economic despair and lack of opportunity. Many hoped to reunite with family members, especially parents, who are already in the United States. The wave of migrants has underscored chronic problems in the region that stem back decades. It is often assumed that international drug trafficking explains the surge in violence since 2009, but other important factors are also at play. Drug trafficking is certainly a factor, especially in areas where criminal control of territory and trafficking routes is contested, but drugs do not explain the entirety of the complex phenomenon. Other factors have also contributed. While there are important differences among the three countries, there are also common factors behind the violence. Strong gang presence in communities often results in competition for territorial and economic control through extortion, kidnapping and the retail sale of illegal drugs. Threats of violence and sexual assault are often tools of neighborhood control, and gang rivalries and revenge killings are commonplace. Elevated rates of domestic abuse, sexual violence, and weak family and household structures also contribute as children are forced to fend for themselves and often chose (or are coerced into) the relative "safety" of the gang or criminal group. Likewise, important external factors such a weak capacity among law enforcement institutions, elevated levels of corruption, and penetration of the state by criminal groups means impunity for crime is extraordinarily high (95 percent or more), and disincentives to criminal activity are almost non-existent. Public confidence in law enforcement is low and crime often goes unreported. U.S. policy and practice are also a major contributing factor to the violence. U.S. consumption of illegal drug remains among the highest in the world, and U.S. and Mexican efforts to interdict drug trafficking in the Caribbean and Mexico has contributed to the trade's relocation to Central America. Furthermore, the policy of deporting large numbers of young Central Americans in the 1990s and 2000s, many of them already gang members in the United States, helped transfer the problem of violent street gangs from the United States to Central America's northern triangle. El Salvador now has the largest number of gang members in Central America followed close behind by Honduras and Guatemala. Finally, the trafficking of firearms, especially from the United States, has also contributed to the lethality and morbidity of crime. Efforts to slow firearms trafficking from the United States have encountered many domestic and political barriers and continue largely unchecked. Over the past year, the Woodrow Wilson Center's Latin American Program has undertaken an extensive review of the principal United States security assistance program for the region-the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI). This review has focused on the major security challenges in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras and how CARSI seeks to address these. This publication includes country reports on each country including a review of the current in-country security context, as well as assessing CARSI's effectiveness for addressing these challenges. The report also includes a chapter providing an in-depth analysis of the geographic distribution of homicides and an examination of how such an analysis can help policy makers design more effective targeted strategies to lower violence. A final chapter outlining policy options for the future completes the report. Details: Washington, DC: Latin America Program, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2015. 155p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed May 26, 2015 at: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Year: 2015 Country: Central America URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/FINAL%20PDF_CARSI%20REPORT_0.pdf Shelf Number: 135789 Keywords: Border SecurityDrug TraffickingDrug-Related ViolenceGangsHomicidesIllegal ImmigrationImmigrationKidnappingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: UNODC Study on Firearms: 2015. A study on the transnational nature of and routes and modus operandi used in trafficking in firearms Summary: The Study was developed to raise global knowledge on illicit trafficking in firearms, including its transnational nature and the routes and modus operandi used, by enhancing understanding of this phenomenon and its links to other serious crimes. The Study is the first of its kind and all Member States were invited "to participate in and contribute to it as appropriate" (para. 7, Conference resolution 6/2). It lays the foundation for further research at the international level on trafficking in firearms. One of the primary objectives was to demonstrate the importance of data collection and analysis on trafficking in firearms and, consequently, highlight the usefulness of monitoring illicit firearms trafficking flows at the national, regional and international levels. This Study demonstrates the importance of continuing efforts to enhance national systems for collection and analysis of detailed data on illicit firearms trafficking. It is a demonstration of the potential future value of improved national systems to collect data and international cooperation in collating and analysing that data. Details: Vienna: UNODC, 2015. 160p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed August 8, 2015 at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf Year: 2015 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/documents/firearms-protocol/UNODC_Study_on_Firearms_WEB.pdf Shelf Number: 136359 Keywords: Organized CrimeTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Akkerman, Mark Title: Border Wars: The Arms Dealers Profiting from Europe's Refugee Tragedy Summary: The refugee crisis facing Europe has caused consternation in the corridors of power, and heated debate on Europe's streets. It has exposed fundamental faultlines in the whole European project, as governments fail to agree on even limited sharing of refugees and instead blame each other. Far-right parties have surged in popularity exploiting austerity-impacted communities in putting the blame for economic recession on a convenient scapegoat as opposed to the powerful banking sector. This has been most potently seen in the UK, where leaders of the 'Leave EU' campaign unscrupulously amplified fears of mass migration to successfully mobilise support for Brexit. Refugees fleeing terrible violence and hardship have been caught in the crossfire; forced to take ever more dangerous routes to get to Europe and facing racist attacks in host nations when they finally arrive. However there is one group of interests that have only benefited from the refugee crisis, and in particular from the European Union's investment in 'securing' its borders. They are the military and security companies that provide the equipment to border guards, the surveillance technology to monitor frontiers, and the IT infrastructure to track population movements. This report turns a spotlight on those border security profiteers, examining who they are and the services they provide, how they both influence and benefit from European policies and what funding they receive from taxpayers. The report shows that far from being passive beneficiaries of EU largesse, these corporations are actively encouraging a growing securitisation of Europe's borders, and willing to provide ever more draconian technologies to do this. Most perverse of all, it shows that some of the beneficiaries of border security contracts are some of the biggest arms sellers to the Middle-East and North-African region, fuelling the conflicts that are the cause of many of the refugees. In other words, the companies creating the crisis are then profiting from it. Moreover they have been abetted by European states who have granted the licences to export arms and have then granted them border security contracts to deal with the consequences. Their actions are also in the framework of an increasingly militarised response to the refugee crisis by the European Union. Under the banner of 'fighting illegal immigration', the European Commission plans to transform its border security agency Frontex into a more powerful European Border and Coast Guard Agency. This would have control over member states border security efforts and a more active role as a border guard itself, including purchasing its own equipment. The agency is backed up by EUROSUR, an EU system connecting member and third states' border security surveillance and monitoring systems. Militarisation of border security is also demonstrated by the military objectives of the 'European Union Naval Force - Mediterranean Operation Sophia' (EUNAVFOR MED) as well as the use of military on many borders, including Hungary, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia. NATO naval missions in the Mediterranean are already actively assisting EU border security. Meanwhile, countries outside the EU are being pushed to take up a role as outpost border guards to try to stop refugees from reaching the EU borders. The recent EU migration deals with Turkey, which have been severely criticised by human rights organisations, deny refugees access to Europe and have resulted in more violence against them. The report shows that: The border security market is booming. Estimated at some 15 billion euros in 2015, it is predicted to rise to over 29 billion euros annually in 2022 The arms business, in particular sales to the Middle-East and North-Africa, where most of the refugees are fleeing from, is also booming. Global arms exports to the Middle-East actually increased by 61 per cent between 2006-10 and 2011-15. Between 2005 and 2014, EU member states granted arms exports licences to the Middle East and North Africa worth over 82 billion euros The European policy response to refugees which has focused on targeting traffickers and strengthening its external borders (including in countries outside the European Union) has led to big budget increases which benefits industry Total EU funding for member state border security measures through its main funding programmes is 4.5 billion euros between 2004 and 2020 Frontex, its main border control agency's budget increased 3,688% between 2005 and 2016 (from $6.3m to $238.7m) EU new member states have been required to strengthen borders as a condition of membership, creating additional markets for profit. Equipment purchased or upgraded with External Borders Fund money includes 54 border surveillance systems, 22,347 items of operating equipment for border surveillance and 212,881 items of operating equipment for border checks Some of the arms sales permits to the Middle-East and North Africa are also intended for border control. In 2015, for example the Dutch government granted a 34 million euro export license to Thales Nederland for the delivery of radar and C3-systems to Egypt despite reports of human right violations in the country The European border security industry is dominated by major arms companies, who have all set up or expanded security divisions as well as a number of smaller IT and specialist security firms. Italian arms giant Finmeccanica identified "border control and security systems" as one of the primary drivers for increase in orders and revenues The big players in Europe's border security complex include arms companies Airbus, Finmeccanica, Thales and Safran, as well as technology giant Indra. Finmeccanica and Airbus have been particularly prominent winners of EU contracts aimed at strengthening borders. Airbus is also the number one winner of EU security research funding contracts Finmecannica, Thales and Airbus, prominent players in the EU security business are also three of the top four European arms traders, all active selling to countries in the Middle East and North Africa. Their total revenues in 2015 amounted to 95 billion euros Israeli companies are the only non-European receivers of research funding (thanks to a 1996 agreement between Israel and the EU) and also have played a role in fortifying the borders of Bulgaria and Hungary, and promote their expertise based on the West Bank separation wall and the Gaza border with Egypt. Israeli firm BTec Electronic Security Systems, selected by Frontex to participate in its April 2014 workshop on 'Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms', boasted in its application mail that its "technologies, solutions and products are installed on [the] Israeli-Palestinian border" The arms and security industry helps shape European border security policy through lobbying, through its regular interactions with EU's border institutions and through its shaping of research policy. The European Organisation for Security (EOS), which includes Thales, Finmecannica and Airbus has been most active in lobbying for increased border security. Many of its proposals, such as its push to set up a cross European border security agency have eventually ended up as policy - see for example the transformation of Frontex into the European Border and Coastguard Agency (EBCG). Moreover Frontex/EBCG's biannual industry days and its participation in special security roundtables and specialist arms and security fairs ensure regular communication and a natural affinity for cooperation. The arms and security industry has successfully captured the 316 million euros funding provided for research in security issues, setting the agenda for research, carrying it out, and then often benefiting from the subsequent contracts that result. Since 2002, the EU has funded 56 projects in the field of border security and border control. Collectively the evidence shows a growing convergence of interests between Europe's political leaders seeking to militarise the borders and its major defence and security contractors who provide the services. But this is not just an issue of conflicts of interest or of profiteering from crisis, it is also about the direction Europe takes at this critical moment. More than a half century ago, then US President Eisenhower warned of the dangers of a military-industrial complex, whose power could "endanger our liberties or democratic processes". Today we have an even more powerful military-security-industrial complex, using technologies that point outwards and inwards, that right now are targeted at some of the most vulnerable desperate people on our planet. Allowing this complex to escape unexamined poses a threat to democracy and to a Europe built on an ideal of cooperation and peace. As Eisenhower put it: "Down the long lane of the history yet to be written... this world of ours, ever growing smaller, must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect. Details: Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 2016. 60p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed July 11, 2016 at: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/border-wars-report-web.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Europe URL: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/border-wars-report-web.pdf Shelf Number: 139605 Keywords: Border ControlBorder SecurityImmigrantsImmigrationRefugeesTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Sutton, Mitchell Title: Transnational crime in Sri Lanka: Future considerations for international cooperation Summary: This report examines transnational, serious and organised crime in Sri Lanka, its impact on neighbouring states, law enforcement cooperation, and the influence of Sri Lanka's changing geopolitical and economic orientation on criminal activity. Geopolitical change was a major influence on the patterns of transnational crime in Sri Lanka, especially the end of the civil war in 2009 and the destruction of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The LTTE's demise ended some activity while changing the patterns of transnational crimes such as arms smuggling, people smuggling and human trafficking. Still, the threat of transnational crime hasn't disappeared from Sri Lanka since the end of the civil war. Local law enforcement agencies and the military are struggling to develop strategies to combat a multifaceted threat exacerbated by the country's porous border with India, international drug rings and cartels, government corruption, and proximity to swathes of under- or ungoverned territory in Myanmar, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. Historical and new international relationships-especially with Russia, China and the Middle East - have also influenced crime patterns in Sri Lanka. Regional states have felt strong impacts from criminal activities involving Sri Lanka. Those impacts have differed markedly, as each affected state has been incorporated into a different place along the contraband supply chain. People smuggling and associated crimes are likely to remain the main concerns for Australia. Drug, arms and human trafficking are likely to pose problems for India and Southeast Asia. Because this criminal activity is diffuse, solutions must necessarily come from both domestic and regional sources, and involve neighbouring states working with the Sri Lankan Government to develop strategies to jointly reduce the threat. Already, a proliferation of different multilateral and bilateral law enforcement cooperation agreements has emerged in response to these challenges. Future engagement should focus on enhancing the intelligence capabilities of Sri Lanka's military and law enforcement agencies, encouraging reforms to eliminate corruption and inefficiency and realigning government agencies to fit the new threat. Details: Barton,. ACT: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2016. 32p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 13, 2016 at: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/transnational-crime-in-sri-lanka-future-considerations-for-international-cooperation/SR94_Sri-Lanka.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Sri Lanka URL: https://www.aspi.org.au/publications/transnational-crime-in-sri-lanka-future-considerations-for-international-cooperation/SR94_Sri-Lanka.pdf Shelf Number: 145538 Keywords: Arms SmugglingDrug TraffickingHuman SmugglingHuman TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Carlson, Khristopher Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Somalia Summary: Evidence of illicit weapons flows within and to Somalia points to multiple sources and end users, and indicates a vast array of weapons types forming such flows, from pistols and rifles to heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). While there has been some success in curbing illicit flows - with seizures and reductions in some supply routes - weapons and ammunition continue to proliferate among a range of non-state actors, including clan militias, opposition groups, and private citizens. In recent years illicit arms flows have been given significant attention at the global level, culminating in September 2015 with the adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, more specifically, SDG Target 16.4, which commits states to significantly reduce illicit arms flows by 2030 (UNGA, 2015). As the Small Arms Survey has pointed out, the UN's proposed indicator for measuring progress towards achieving this target - Indicator 16.4.21 - can be complemented with a range of additional indicators (De Martino and Atwood, 2015). In this context, this Research Note - the first in a series of four on measuring illicit arms flows in selected countries - addresses some of the dynamics of illicit weapons flows into and within the South Central region of Somalia ('South Central'), which is an area of active armed conflict. In particular, it highlights opportunities to enhance stakeholders - knowledge about illicit weapons and ammunition trends through the regular collection of data on seizures to support progress towards the achievement of Target 16.4 in Somalia. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2016. 4p. Source: Internet Resource: Research Notes, no. 61: Accessed October 20, 2016 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-61.pdf Year: 2016 Country: Somalia URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/H-Research_Notes/SAS-Research-Note-61.pdf Shelf Number: 145888 Keywords: Illicit ArmsIllicit WeaponsTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Martyniuk, Anton Title: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine Summary: Measuring Illicit Arms Flows: Ukraine is the fourth case study in a series examining the measurement of illicit arms flows in the context of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), specifically SDG 16. Based on interviews carried out in Kiev in addition to desk research , this analysis outlines the sources of illicit arms flows in Ukraine and the status of government plans or action to counter the problem, the trafficking routes used to smuggle weapons, and key indicators of illicit arms flows in the period 2010-2016. Key findings: Ukrainian civilians possess large numbers of unregistered small arms. The conflict in the east has contributed to significant diversion and losses from national stockpiles and the proliferation of a wider array of weapons types. The conflict and the concomitant increase in insecurity correlate with increased seizures from 2013 to 2014, although efforts to stem the proliferation of weapons have recovered only a modest number of illicit firearms. Ukraine still has no primary law regulating the manufacture, purchase, and possession of firearms and no central state register of civilian-held firearms. This makes it difficult even to differentiate between legal and illegal firearms in the country - and, by extension, complicates efforts to monitor and address illicit arms flows. Details: Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2017. 8p. Source: Internet Resource: Briefing Paper: Accessed May 3, 2017 at: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP3-Ukraine.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Ukraine URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-BP3-Ukraine.pdf Shelf Number: 145253 Keywords: Firearms Trafficking Illicit Arms Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: Galemba, Rebecca B. Title: Cultures of Contraband: Contesting Illegality at the Mexico-Guatemala Border Summary: Driving from Frontera Comalapa, Chiapas, Mexico to the communities on the Mexico-Guatemala border where I planned to live and conduct fieldwork from September 2006- September 2007, I drove through several rural farms, towns, and winding roads. Upon reaching the Pan-American Highway is a makeshift police station, a small concrete building labeled, PFP (Policia Federal Preventiva, or Federal Preventative Police). Outside a police car was stationed as traffic whizzed by. Shortly before entering the border communities, there is also a military base. The Mexican government installed this base in the late 1990s during the Zapatista conflict to monitor resistance, despite the fact that the Zapatistas had little presence in the Comalapa region. The military currently uses the base to erect road blockades to inspect for contraband, illegal migrants, illicit drugs, and illegal firearms. There were almost always blockades on Fridays so that soldiers could inspect vehicles returning from market day at the official border crossing at La Mesilla, Guatemala and Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, Mexico. I had originally intended to conduct research at the Mexico-Guatemala border to study the contrasts between policies that simultaneously advocated an "open" border for free trade and a militarized border to comply with Washington's security demands to stem the northward flow of illicit drugs, crime, and undocumented migrants (Benitez Manaut 2003; Pickard, CIEPAC 2007). Despite the increased presence of the Mexican military and police forces2 in the region, border residents agreed that since the late 1990s they experienced less official border surveillance. Instead, residents allude to a booming industry of cross-border contraband in everyday goods, as well as undocumented migrants, arms, and drugs. I realized that my original interest in undocumented migration formed part of a larger picture of historical and cross-border flows of people, goods, and information. Studying border flows from the ground-up revealed a border region that was not just simultaneously "open" to goods and "closed" to people as I had anticipated, but full of various contingent and conflicting openings and enclosures. When I interviewed a Mexican customs inspector at Ciudad Cuauhtemoc, he lamented, "In this region illegality governs. It is what distinguishes this region [from other customs inspections posts]." This inspector had worked in multiple customs ports throughout Mexico, but seemed to resign and adapt himself to this aspect of "illegality," referring to it as part of the "regional culture." Despite stricter laws and Mexico's modernization of the official border crossing and customs inspections in the late 1990s, he told me that most commerce in the region occurred in clandestine crossings. This dissertation examines the multiple meanings of illegality and how notions of illegality permeate, and at times govern, social, political, and economic life at the Mexico-Guatemala border. A 2006 article in El Financiero, labeled the Mexico-Guatemala border "a paradise for contraband...[stating that] the problem, which is little spoken about, is that illegality dominates everything at the border." By focusing on the residents of a clandestine border pathway on the Mexico-Guatemala border, I problematize the concept of "illegality," arguing that the social and economic relations engendered by illegal practices often generate new forms of law, economy, and moral norms. While legal and illegal practices may blur in everyday interactions (Nordstrom 2007), I examine how residents distinguish and organize the heterogeneity of these practices in order to situate illegality within the larger political and moral economy. By examining the daily relations between border residents, state and federal agents, farmers, formal-sector companies, and smugglers, I illustrate how illegality produces and reconstitutes gendered, ethnic, and class inflected subjectivities. Details: Providence, RI: Brown University, 2009. 364p. Source: Internet Resource: Dissertation: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Year: 2009 Country: Mexico URL: https://repository.library.brown.edu/storage/bdr:155/PDF/ Shelf Number: 130138 Keywords: Border SecurityContrabandDrug TraffickingIllegal FirearmsIllegal MigrantsIllicit DrugsTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Heley, Frank Anton Title: .Assessment and Policy Recommendation On Domestic Illegal Firearms Trafficking Summary: This report examined the nature of domestic illegal firearms trafficking, including key features and predictors of firearms trafficking, and rationalizes the defining of domestic illegal firearms trafficking into three levels that are indicative of the seriousness and features inherent to the particular level of trafficking. This report also examined the scope of the trafficking situations at their respective levels, the means already being utilized to address firearms trafficking problems, and their effectiveness. Finally, this report recognizes that the differing levels of trafficking may require varied and differing efforts be used in combating firearms trafficking and policy recommendations involving both legislative and enforcement efforts are detailed at the respective levels of trafficking. Details: Fargo, ND: North Dakota State University, 2012. 92p. Source: Internet Resource: Thesis: Accessed September 14, 2017 at: https://library.ndsu.edu/ir/bitstream/handle/10365/19540/Frank%20Anton%20Heley.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://library.ndsu.edu/ir/bitstream/handle/10365/19540/Frank%20Anton%20Heley.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y Shelf Number: 147260 Keywords: Firearms TraffickingIllegal FirearmsTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking Weapons |
Author: B.C. Task Force on Illegal Firearms Title: Illegal Firearms Task Force: Final Report Summary: British Columbia continues to experience troubling and highly dangerous incidents of firearms violence that have resulted in numerous deaths and injuries. Highly public and brazen acts, often linked to organized crime and gangs, place innocent members of the public at risk, create fear, hardship and tragedy for the individuals and communities affected, and impose substantial burdens on public resources. The Government of B.C., in an enhanced provincial strategy to combat guns and gangs, convened an Illegal Firearms Task Force to make recommendations for action to the B.C. Minister of Public Safety & Solicitor General. The Task Force, consisting of provincial experts with a wide range of experience in managing illegal firearms and organized crime, reviewed and analyzed the existing published research, interviewed numerous individuals and organizations, and conducted community consultations around B.C. It reviewed the information presented and developed recommendations addressing both specific issues that had been identified and broad strategic approaches. Four themes - The recommendations fall into four themes: Theme #1: Strategic Approaches Coordinating and focussing the efforts of the diverse agencies that work to reduce crime and enhance public safety will ensure the most effective use of resources and the greatest impact in limiting the availability and use of illegal firearms. Action categories include: - An illegal firearms-focussed approach - Alignment of existing and enhanced resources in order to improve outcomes relative to illegal firearms trafficking, their availability to criminals and the manner in which they are used by organized crime - Road safety and illegal firearms - Road safety initiatives to reduce the incidence of illegal firearms possession in motor vehicles and the concurrent use of illegal firearms and motor vehicles to carry out organized crime violence - Provincial Tactical Enforcement Priority - Leveraging the innovative and unique capabilities of the Provincial Tactical Enforcement Priority model to maximize intelligence, disruption and enforcement of illegal firearms traffickers and the targeting of those who use firearms to support violent organized crime activity - Firearms tracing hub and labs - The enhanced and timely analysis of all recovered firearms and the determination of their potential association with crime to provide investigative information and strategic intelligence - Alignment of law enforcement policy - The alignment and modernization of law enforcement policy with the education of law enforcement officers and Crown prosecutors to realize strategic objectives related to illegal firearms trafficking and the use of illegal firearms in violent crimes - "Bar Watch" programs - Expansion of a successful Vancouver program to deter and mitigate gang and firearms violence within licenced liquor establishments throughout the province Theme #2: Legislative Initiatives Firearms possession and the criminal use of firearms are primarily governed by federal legislation. The Task Force has made several recommendations related to the enhancement of federal legislation and the creation of provincial legislation in order to reduce the risks of illegal firearms use. Action categories include: - Quebec's mass shooting and firearms violence mitigation: A model for provincial actions - Legislation that enhances the ability of law enforcement and partner agencies to identify and prevent firearms violence through the timely sharing of information - Imitation firearms - Legislation to control the access and use of readily available imitation firearms; to limit their risk to communities, first responders and those who possess them; and to disrupt early patterns of illegal firearms use by youth - Straw purchasers and point-of-sale record-keeping - Legislation requiring sellers to keep records of firearms sales (not a central registry), enhancing the ability of judicially authorized law enforcement to trace crime guns, collect firearms trafficking intelligence and deter firearms traffickers - Manufacture of untraceable firearms - Legislation to prohibit access to unmarked firearms parts and parts that can be assembled into illegal firearms Theme #3: Education and Prevention Focussed efforts by a wide range of stakeholders and agencies working with the public, industry and communities will create awareness, build resilience and reduce the acquisition, availability and use of illegal firearms in B.C. communities. Action categories include: - Safe schools, student and parent education - Leveraging existing school-based programs to disrupt potentially violent antisocial behaviour, including the use of firearms, and to ensure the understanding of educators and parents on the factors and indicators related to violence prevention - Community-based programs - Rural and First Nations communities - Tailored community-based strategies designed to recognize the specific risks associated with communities in which firearms are readily available and which experience violence and organized crime involving firearms - Canadian Firearms Program compliance strategies - Enhancing compliance efforts pursuant to the firearms regulations designed to prevent and deter illegal firearms trafficking - Registration issues from the former Restricted Weapons Registration System - Initiatives to reduce the large number of restricted and prohibited firearms that are not in compliance with current registration requirements and no longer under the oversight of the Canadian Firearms Program Theme #4: Data Collection and Information Sharing The purposeful collection of intelligence from a variety of sources will inform prevention, enforcement and disruption efforts by all stakeholders against the trafficking, possession and use of illegal firearms. The Task Force has made recommendations in two action categories, including: - Intelligence and data quality - Assigning a lead intelligence agency and data warehouse to coordinate all intelligence collection, assure data quality and facilitate analysis related to the trafficking, possession and use of illegal firearms - PRIME-BC access by all key stakeholders - Providing necessary access to B.C.'s own Police Record Information Management System (PRIME-BC) to key agencies engaged in illegal firearms prevention, enforcement and disruption Details: Victoria, BC: Minister of Public Safety and Solicitor General of British Columbia, 2017. 138p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 29, 2017 at: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/police/publications/government/iftf_final_report_pdf.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Canada URL: https://www2.gov.bc.ca/assets/gov/law-crime-and-justice/criminal-justice/police/publications/government/iftf_final_report_pdf.pdf Shelf Number: 148534 Keywords: GangsGun Control PolicyGun ViolenceGun-Related ViolenceHomicidesIllegal FirearmsMurdersOrganized CrimeTrafficking in Firearms |
Author: Savona, Ernesto U. Title: Fighting Illicit Firearms Trafficking Routes and Actors at European Level: Final Report of Project FIRE Summary: Project FIRE - Fighting Illicit firearms trafficking Routes and actors at European level (www. fireproject.eu) - was carried out with the financial support of the European Commission, DG Home Affairs, within the Prevention of and the Fight against Crime (ISEC) Programme. The research is an exploratory study on the illicit trafficking of firearms (ITF) in the EU. Based on the results obtained, it also provides recommendations on how to improve the fight against and the prevention of ITF. For the purposes of the study, ITF has been defined as every case in which the illicit acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or transfer of firearms, their parts or ammunition occur from, to, or within the territory of the EU. Background The availability of firearms is recognised as an increasingly pressing issue because of the lethal impact that firearms can have in terms of violence and terrorism. For this reason, the EU is currently revising its Firearms Directive, and the fight against organised crime and terrorism ranks high on the European security agenda. However, the role that ITF plays in feeding into violence within the EU has long been disregarded. This has been mirrored by a lack of priority given to rigorous investigation of the origins of firearms involved in the commission of crimes-and a lack of scientific research in the field. In addition, there is a lack of public official data on ITF. Approach Project FIRE adopts an integrated market perspective to address these difficulties and to study ITF within a wider framework of illicit markets. This approach makes it possible to combine analysis of both the various stages within the illicit supply chain of ITF and the demand for illicit firearms. It develops a methodology based on the collection and analysis of data from online news and law enforcement agencies (LEAs) and custom press releases, providing high level of detail and a large number of variables. For this purpose, firearm seizures have been considered as a proxy for the ITF, and deadly and non-deadly shootings as proxies for the demand for illicit firearms. This study represents a first step towards better understanding of the ITF in the EU. It is accordingly an important resource for both public and private institutions and researchers. The results from the project have been grouped into three parts: - ITF in the EU (Part I) - The EU's regulatory framework to counter ITF (Part II) - Recommendations on how to improve the prevention of and fight against ITF (Part III). Details: Milano: Transcrime - Universita Cattolica del Sacro Cuore 2017. 116p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 10, 2018 at: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FIREFinalReport.pdf Year: 2017 Country: Europe URL: http://www.transcrime.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/FIREFinalReport.pdf Shelf Number: 149749 Keywords: FirearmsFirearms TraffickingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in WeaponsWeapons |
Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe. Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE Summary: Project SAFTE is an international research project, funded by the European Commission, that aims to contribute to the fight against (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe. This research project has demonstrated the existence of various illicit firearms markets in the EU, each with their own specific features and dynamics. The traditionally closed character of these markets has partially eroded in several EU member states in recent years, which has increased the availability of firearms in general, and military-grade firearms in particular, to criminals and to terrorists with criminal connections. To combat this, a comprehensive and proactive approach is needed that consists of improving the intelligence picture on illicit firearms trafficking, upgrading the policy and the regulatory framework on firearms, and optimising operational capacities and cooperation. Background Several terrorist attacks have been carried out with firearms in Europe in recent years, causing the deaths of hundreds of people and injuries to hundreds more. These events demonstrate that terrorists are able to get their hands on various types of firearms, including military-grade firearms. Although the use of firearms to commit terrorist attacks is not a new phenomenon in the EU, Europol recently noted that firearms have become the most prevalent type of weaponry used by terrorists and violent extremists across a range of ideologies. This observation led policy-makers in Europe to develop specific measures to combat terrorist access to firearms. In-depth, evidence-based insight into the firearms acquisition dynamics of terrorists in the EU is limited, however. This is part of the larger problem of the scarcity of reliable data and in-depth research with regard to Europe's illicit firearms markets. Process The goal of Project SAFTE is to improve knowledge regarding (terrorist access to) illicit firearms markets in Europe and to provide information that can influence policy intended to enhance the fight against this security threat. The Flemish Peace Institute coordinated the project, and carried it out in partnership with the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the Scuola Superiore di Studi Universitarie di Perfezionamento Sant'Anna (SSSA). In addition, research teams from Arquebus Solutions, the Small Arms Survey and Bureau Bruinsma contributed extensively to the study. The design of the research project consisted of two phases. In a first phase, specialised research teams conducted qualitative, in-depth studies into illicit firearms markets, terrorist access to these markets and national policies to counter these phenomena in eight EU member states: Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, France, Italy, Romania, the Netherlands and the UK. More than one hundred key national actors were interviewed during this process. The second phase consisted of a systematic and comparative analysis, in which the studies in these countries were supplemented by an explorative mapping of the situation in the other twenty EU member states. In addition, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood (the Balkans, Northern Africa and Ukraine), to address the significant interconnections between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. All these findings were then linked to the EU policy context by, for example, interviews with several key international actors. The research conducted for Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications. The findings of the systematic and comparative analysis are presented in a policyoriented synthesis report, Firearms acquisition by terrorists in Europe: Research findings and policy recommendations of Project SAFTE. A separately edited volume, Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe, publishes the individual country studies, together with the studies on the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa and Ukraine. indings on illicit firearms markets There is no unified illicit firearms market in the EU. Various regional variants of illicit firearms markets can be identified, however, each with distinct characteristics and dynamics. These differences can be attributed to a variety of local elements that shape local demand and supply of illicit firearms and influence the involvement of different actors. Although it is currently impossible to quantitatively estimate the scope of illicit firearms markets in the EU in a credible way, it is clear that most of the firearms that are available on illicit firearms markets are handguns. The presence of military-grade firearms is generally more limited. The easy and cheap access to certain firearms in some countries strongly contributes to illicit firearms trafficking across the EU. Most illicit firearms markets in Europe are driven by criminal demand. Different types of criminals tend to procure, possess and use different types of firearms, and contemporary terrorist networks usually rely on established criminal connections to acquire firearms from these markets. Furthermore, a significant proportion of the illicitly possessed firearms are in the hands of private citizens in several EU member states who have no criminal or terrorist motives. These are individuals who simply possess firearms without holding the necessary permits. Firearms end up in illicit markets in the EU through cross-border smuggling from both outside the EU (mainly from the Western Balkans) and intra-EU trafficking (mainly as a result of differences in national legislation). The most important illicit supply mechanisms for firearms in the EU are cross-border smuggling, change of ownership through theft, the conversion of blank-firing guns, and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. Each EU member state has a different illicit firearms market with its distinct supply mechanisms, however. These different supply mechanisms are characterised by their own dynamics, and present specific policy and law enforcement challenges. Our analyses indicate that supplying firearms to European illicit firearms markets is not very lucrative, and is generally not a primary source of income for those actors involved in trafficking firearms. Another observation is the cyclical nature of supply and demand in these markets. The actors involved in firearms trafficking in the EU have constantly adapted their operating methods in reaction to regional, national and European policy initiatives and law enforcement operations. Traditionally, illicit firearms markets in Europe are closed markets with restricted access for people outside criminal networks, and having the right criminal connections and reputation are crucial factors in this, even in countries with rather high levels of illicit firearms possession. Differences can be observed in the access to illicit firearms, and especially military-grade firearms, and these differences are linked to the criminal hierarchy and the criminal milieu to which the potential buyer belongs. They are also reflected by a price hierarchy for illicit firearms markets that is similar across the EU: the most expensive firearms on the illicit firearms market are generally military-grade firearms such as assault rifles, while the cheapest firearms are generally (converted) blank-firing firearms. The closed character of these markets has been under pressure in recent years, which is linked to the observed growing availability of certain types of firearms. The underlying factors of this erosion are the emergence of the Internet, the crossborder smuggling of military-grade assault rifles into the EU, the conversion of blank-firing guns and the reactivation of deactivated firearms and acoustic expansion weapons. The increased availability of firearms has contributed to arms races between criminal groups across the EU. This has facilitated the gradual tricklingdown of the possession and use of firearms to lower segments of the criminal hierarchy in several EU member states, especially in Western Europe. Findings on terrorist access to illicit firearms markets Significant amounts of firearms have been seized from different types of terrorist networks in recent years. These firearms include various models and brands of pistols and revolvers, but also various types of military-grade firearms, such as assault rifles and sub-machine guns. Terrorists who procure firearms generally do so exclusively for carrying out terrorist acts and to defend themselves against law enforcement agencies. Most terrorists seem to have a preference for military-grade firearms, although the observed possession of less-suitable firearms among terrorist networks suggests that not all terrorists have access to a wide range of firearms. Our comparative analysis identified clear distinctions between different types of terrorist networks in the EU in the acquisition, possession and use of firearms. While the traditional separatist groups have developed their own distinct (and context-specific) firearms acquisition patterns, religiously-inspired terrorist networks across the EU generally rely on criminal connections to obtain firearms from local illicit markets. There are no indications of significant firearms flows between the various types of terrorist networks in Europe today and also no indications of recent state-sponsored arms transfers to terrorist groups in the EU. For most of the contemporary terrorist networks operating in Europe, access to local criminal firearms markets is a key element in their firearms acquisition patterns. Through their criminal pasts, contemporary terrorists with criminal antecedents have acquired various skills that can be used in the planning and execution of successful terrorist attacks, including the skills and network needed to acquire weapons more easily. Given the generally closed character of these markets, only terrorists with the right criminal connections can acquire firearms, and in particular military-grade firearms, on illicit firearms markets in the EU. The observed terrorist firearms arsenals therefore generally reflect the specific dynamics of the local criminal firearms market. Individuals without a developed criminal network generally experience more difficulties in their attempts to acquire firearms, and are more likely to use an alternative acquisition method, for example the Internet, or to use a different type of weapon. No illicit firearms dealers have been observed who exclusively supply firearms to terrorist networks. There seem to be a number of barriers that inhibit criminals from actively and knowingly supplying weapons for terrorist attacks. Illicit firearms dealers are generally not eager to engage in activities that are not very lucrative, but at the same time involve an increased risk of detection and higher penalties. Terrorists will generally rely on already established criminal connections, often pre-dating their radicalisation, in order to obtain firearms on illicit markets, and sellers often do not know they are selling to terrorists. This can be observed among the significant number of terrorists with a criminal history. Prisons have also been identified as places that offer new opportunities for terrorists who do not yet have the necessary criminal connections to acquire firearms. The overwhelming majority of those perpetrators of recent jihadi terrorist attacks who had a criminal history were involved in low-level criminality. There have been some exceptions of perpetrators who attained a mid-level position in the criminal underworld, but none of the perpetrators or people arrested for plotting terrorist attacks in the EU in recent years was a member of a high-level organised crime group. In countries where illicit firearms supply channels are tightly controlled by a limited number of highly-organised crime groups, it is quite difficult for terrorists to acquire firearms. In particular, countries with more chaotic criminal landscapes present potential terrorists with increased opportunities for illicit firearms acquisition. Individuals who acquire firearms for a terrorist network are generally not recruited for this specific purpose, but are already part of the network, and become responsible for this task later because of their skills and networks. Contemporary terrorist networks seeking (specific types of) firearms, but who lack the necessary criminal connections or are operating in a context of limited firearms availability in the local illicit market, can engage in the direct diversion of legally owned firearms, for example by targeted thefts of firearms from state stockpiles or legal gun owners. From a historical perspective, targeted thefts have been a vital element in the firearms acquisition patterns of separatist terror groups in Europe, but such thefts have decreased in recent years. Firearms that were deliberately stolen have only been encountered among jihadi networks in exceptional cases. The diversion of legal ownership for terrorist aims through various forms of embezzlement is also quite exceptional in the EU, as well as the legal possession of firearms by perpetrators of terrorist attacks. Yet, in some EU member states significant numbers of legally-owned firearms have been observed among members of extremist networks, and especially right-wing networks. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 236p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/vrede_syntheserapport_safte_lr.pdf Shelf Number: 149820 Keywords: Illicit FirearmsTerrorismTerroristsTrafficking in FirearmsTrafficking in Weapons |
Author: Duquet, Nils Title: Triggering Terror: Illicit Gun Markets and Firearms Acquisition of Terrorist Networks in Europe Summary: In recent years there has been growing policy attention for illicit firearms markets in Europe. Yet, in-depth research into the scale of the problem as well as the specific characteristics and dynamics of these markets is lacking for most EU member states. This is part of larger problem where firearms and gun violence in the European context have traditionally received scant research attention. To illustrate this, in 2012 Greene and Marsh found that, between 1999 and 2009, 665 Web of Science articles had been written on firearms and violence. Two thirds of these articles, however, covered the situation in the United States (US), and were written primarily by authors based in the US.1 In contrast, research on the situation in Europe continues to be rather sparse. One of the reasons for this difference is that levels of gun crime and gun deaths in Europe are relatively low. A recent study demonstrated that, in the EU, on an annual basis an average of 1,000 homicides are committed with a firearm.2 As such, firearms-related homicides in Europe are among the lowest in the world.3 In addition, large-scale illicit firearms trafficking is quite exceptional in the EU and the illicit firearms market is considered to be modest in size. Nevertheless, the lack of a sound understanding of illicit firearms markets in Europe is not only an epistemological problem. It has obvious and far-reaching policy implications. Specifically, it hampers attempts to develop and implement a comprehensive regulatory and operational approach to combat illicit firearms markets and terrorist access to these markets. The EU has repeatedly stated that building a better intelligence picture on this multifaceted security phenomenon is urgently needed. Recent terrorist attacks involving firearms in Europe significantly boosted the sense of urgency. Both at national and EU levels various legislative and policy initiatives have been undertaken to reinforce the fight against illicit firearms trafficking in general, and to prevent terrorist firearms acquisition in particular. Yet, due to the lack of sound research, these initiatives have often been based on a case-bound, partial or even completely lacking, meaningful intelligence pictures. A mature research community could contribute significantly to the intelligence picture of illicit firearms trafficking that is being developed by national law enforcement agencies and Europol. Yet, a European research community focused on illicit firearms trafficking and gun violence in Europe is currently still germinal. In their extensive literature review Greene and Marsh identified two distinct research mainly relied on in-depth interviews with key national actors involved in the combat against illicit firearms trafficking or terrorism. During the initial phase of the research, it became clear that the phenomena under consideration could not be adequately understood without a sounder understanding of what happened in Europe's wider neighbourhood. Therefore, in addition to the eight country studies, an assessment was made of the illicit possession and proliferation of firearms in the wider EU neighbourhood in order to address the significant nexus between the EU's internal and external security dimensions in terms of illicit firearms trafficking. Overview of the chapters The research conducted within the framework of Project SAFTE resulted in two separate publications: a policy report and a comprehensive research volume. The policy report10 contains the systematic and comparative analysis of the main findings of the different country and neighbourhood studies, whereas this research volume contains all eight in-depth country studies and two neighbourhood studies as separate chapters. This allows the reader to gain profounder and more detailed insight into the research findings of Project SAFTE. The first chapter of this book examines the illicit gun market in Belgium, a country often labelled as one of Europe's hotspots for illicit firearms trade. In this chapter Nils Duquet and Kevin Goris argue that the illicit gun market in Belgium is largely driven by criminal demand, especially from drugs criminals, armed robbers and organized motorcycle gangs. In recent years an increase in converted blank firing weapons and reactivated firearms has been observed. The availability of these weapons eroded the traditional closed character of this market. This made it easier for both lower-ranking criminals and terrorists with criminal connections to acquire firearms. The authors warn that current heightened prioritisation of terrorism in Belgium has become a double-edged sword in the fight against illicit firearms trafficking: while it has increased policy attention for this security phenomenon, it has also brought about a (temporary) displacement of people and resources towards preventing and investigating terrorism. Duquet and Goris conclude that Belgian law enforcement services all too often treat terrorism and illicit firearms trafficking as two distinct problems. They strongly recommend better information sharing and the development of joint actions between and within the law enforcement services that combat these interconnected security phenomena. In the second chapter Filip Dragovic, Paul James, Kresimir Mamic and Robert Mikac analyse the illicit firearms market in Croatia. Despite large number of weapons handed in during voluntary surrender programmes, the current illicit firearms market in Croatia is still largely based on the significant presence of weapons left over from the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, including large quantities of military grade firearms. A great number of these legacy weapons ended up in the hands of civilians. The authors note that alongside these legacy weapons, firearms have also entered the illicit market through illicit production and thefts. Small storage facilities at police stations and lower-level military units in particular, remain prone to theft. Interestingly, the authors argue that, despite the widespread illegal firearms possession in the country, Croatia is not characterized by a very active illicit firearms market because many of the illegal gun owners prefer to retain their firearms. They conclude that research on the Croatian illicit firearms market is still limited and stress the need for more cooperation between law enforcement agencies, judicial bodies, the private sector and the research community to improve the current intelligence picture and enhance the combat against illicit firearms trafficking. In the third chapter of this book Lina Grip demonstrates that the illicit gun market in Denmark is fragmented and supply-driven. Criminal gangs, both organized motorcycle gangs as well as less organized urban street gangs, are the main customers on the illicit firearms market in Denmark. Violent conflicts between such groups are responsible for most of the public shootings in the country. A majority of firearms on this market are locally sourced, especially through thefts of old unregistered firearms. Grip warns that shooting clubs are commonly being used by criminals to practice their shooting skills and as a target for thefts. She also stresses the role played by gun enthusiasts, without violent or criminal intentions, who act outside of the law and this way may feed the illicit market. Not surprisingly, the firearms used in recent terrorist attacks in Denmark were acquired through thefts. While Danish policy to combat illicit firearms possession has been primarily focused on deterring the use of firearms by criminal gangs, Grip concludes that more can be done to integrate firearms-specific initiatives into programmes to prevent violent extremism. In the fourth chapter Nicolas Florquin and Andre Desmarais present a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the illicit firearms market in France and the firearms possessed and used by different terrorist groups in recent years. They argue that France has a sizeable and growing pool of illicit firearms as a result of a historic tolerance towards unregistered rifles and shotguns, and because of cross-border smuggling of firearms in recent decades. This chapter demonstrates that the firearms on the French illicit market originate from a wide variety of sources and that terrorist groups have used a wide range of procurement methods to access firearms. Florquin and Desmarais demonstrate that different types of terrorist groups and networks are characterized by different firearms acquisition patterns. While jihadi terrorist networks have used their, mainly low-level, criminal connections to procure firearms, a terrorist group like ETA, for example, has instead relied heavily on targeted thefts. Tracing firearms often proves very difficult, but the authors stress the merits of doing so. The tracing of the reactivated rifles used in recent terrorist attacks, for example, has been a crucial step in building momentum to politically address the problem of easy-to-reactivate weapons from Slovakia. The illicit firearms market in Italy and terrorist access to this market is the focus of the fifth chapter. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni note that the Italian market has mainly been supplied with a wide variety of firearms from the Western Balkans since the 1990s, but that organised crime groups have also relied on firearms thefts and the reactivation of firearms. The authors stress that terrorist access to this market is rather difficult because the supply channels are tightly controlled by Italian organised criminal groups, who believe that it is not in their best interest to sell firearms to terrorist networks. In the sixth chapter Monique Bruinsma and Toine Spapens provide an overview of the main features of the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands as well as an in depth analysis of terrorist access to this market and Dutch policies that have been developed to tackle this access. This chapter demonstrates the increased availability and criminal use of military-grade assault rifles in the country in recent years. This has partly been a result of trafficking of easy-to-reactivate firearms from Slovakia. Not only criminals, but also terrorists have been able to access the illicit firearms market in the Netherlands. In recent years the Dutch police have arrested at least fifteen terror suspects for the illegal possession or (attempted) acquisition of firearms. An in-depth analysis indicates that a broad range of firearms have been seized in these cases and demonstrates a firearms acquisition pattern for terrorists in which (usually pre-existing) criminal connections are crucial. The seventh chapter contains the first ever in-depth study on the illicit firearms market in Romania. Roxana Albisteanu, Alexandru Dena and Matthew Lewis note that researching this topic in Romania is hindered by the lack of uniform data collection and registration procedures on illicit firearms possession or use by the different law enforcement and other government agencies involved. Despite this caveat, the authors clearly demonstrate the detrimental effects of national legal loopholes on regional illicit firearms markets: the significant availability of easy-toconvert blank firing firearms in Romania is directly connected to the situation in Bulgaria, where these weapons can be bought legally for low prices and where controls can easily be bypassed. This has resulted in significant cross-border smuggling of these weapons into Romania where they are sold to Romanian criminals across the country and in various criminal contexts. While there are no known recent cases of terrorist acquisition of firearms in the country, the authors warn that some of the firearms that are currently legally exported from Romania and EU member states to third countries might eventually end up on criminal markets in the EU, where they can be bought by local terrorists. In the eighth chapter Paul Holtom, Paul James and Connor Patmore analyse terrorist access to the illicit firearms market in the United Kingdom (UK). The authors demonstrate that the combination of a restrictive legislative framework for legal firearms possession, a proactive operational 'investigate the gun' - approach to combat illicit possession and use of firearms, and the use of tough prison sentences as a deterrent, has had a positive influence on the illicit firearms markets in the UK. The firearms that circulate in the UK's criminal underground are therefore very often converted blank firing weapons and antique handguns rather than more heavy duty variants seen elsewhere. The recent cases of terrorist possession of firearms suggest that the access of jihadi and right-wing terrorists to the illicit firearms market is likewise quite restricted. These terrorists' options are largely restricted to converted or antique firearms. They do not usually have access to the semi-automatic or automatic firearms that have been used in terrorist attacks in other parts of the EU. The findings of this chapter, however, indicate that the situation in Northern Ireland differs significantly, with Republican splinter groups having retained a wide range of legacy weapons from the 'Troubles', including different types of military-grade firearms, and continuing to use them in politically motivated attacks. The illicit proliferation of firearms in Northern Africa is the focus of the ninth chapter of this book. Francesco Strazzari and Francesca Zampagni argue that in recent years illicit firearms possession has increased significantly in several Northern African countries as a direct result of the volatile political and security situation in the region. In particular the fall of the Libyan dictator Qaddafi in 2011 and the armed violence that has ravaged the country afterwards has significantly increased illicit arms trafficking. A vast regional black market in firearms has emerged which has reached various groups from the western Sahel to the Middle East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit East. The authors conclude that while significant firearms trafficking from Northern Africa into the EU has not been detected so far, the absence of an effective and efficient firearms and ammunition management system in Northern Africa increases the risk of firearms diversion. In the final chapter of this book Francesco Buscemi, Nils Duquet, Ekaterina Golovko and Eric Woods analyse the proliferation of firearms in conflict-affected Ukraine, where the number of illicitly-held firearms surpasses the number of legally held firearms. While several historical factors have contributed to high levels of illicit firearms possession, the authors demonstrate that criminal activities and the recent episodes of armed violence in the country have significantly exacerbated opportunities for state stockpile captures and arms transfers to different non-state actors. While most of the firearms trafficking is currently contained within the state borders of Ukraine, the authors warn that there are signs that this will likely change when the armed conflict stabilizes and the internal demand for these weapons decreases. Details: Brussels: Flemish Peace Institute, 2018. 484p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 18, 2018 at http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Year: 2018 Country: Europe URL: http://www.flemishpeaceinstitute.eu/sites/vlaamsvredesinstituut.eu/files/wysiwyg/boek_safte_bw_lowres.pdf Shelf Number: 149844 Keywords: FirearmsGun MarketsIllicit Firearms Smuggling of FirearmsTerrorism Terrorists Trafficking in Firearms Trafficking in Weapons |
Author: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Title: Results of a pilot survey of forty selected organized criminal groups in sixteen countries Summary: Globalization and growing economic interdependence have encouraged and promoted the transformation of crime beyond borders in all parts of the world. Improved communications and information technologies, increased blurring of national borders, greater mobility of people, goods and services across countries, and the emergence of a globalized economy have moved crime further away from its domestic base. The nature of organized crime in the contemporary world then cannot be understood separately from the concept of globalization. In 1998, in recognition of these factors, the Member States of the United Nations decided to established an ad hoc Committee for the purpose of elaborating a comprehensive international Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (TOC). The ad hoc Committee succeeded in drafting four international legal instruments -- the Convention and three Protocols on Trafficking in Persons, Smuggling of Migrants and Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms -- that will facilitate the prevention and combating of transnational organized crime. Through the ratification of these instruments several new legal concepts and mechanisms will be adopted by the State Parties who ratify the Convention. Of importance in this regard, is the criminalizing of participation in the activities of a criminal group itself. Importantly too, the Convention will provide a basic framework of cooperation across a large number of countries in the fight against organized crime. Critical to the implementation and monitoring of the TOC Convention will be the ability to access reliable information on international organized crime trends. Adequate information on ongoing developments from a global perspective may provide a useful marker against which progress can be measured and changes in the nature of organized crime assessed. At the same time, an international effort to collect data on developments in organized crime around the globe would provide a platform for the work of a wide ranging number of individuals and governments who are increasingly adopting more systematic ways of acquiring information on organized criminal groups. Beyond the establishment of an overall measure to assess trends in organized crime, the development of a more comprehensive system of classification and the ongoing collection of data on criminal groups provides a useful tool for both law enforcement officials and prosecutors. Information on various criminal groups serves not only to inform counterparts in other countries what kind of criminal groups are being investigated in specific states, but allows information on the activities of similar groups to be compared. If combined with data about institutional arrangements and strategies of states in addressing crime, it provides insights into the viability of measures and strategies adopted in tackling various types of criminal groups. Important to note here is that by providing a standard set of agreed upon definitions, for example for the term "organised crime group" and for offences such as "trafficking in human beings", the Convention and its Protocols have in effect established a base-line for future research and analysis. If all the countries which ratify the Convention use the same terminology and definitions, the task of comparative analysis is made much easier. To further the debate on measures and instruments to collect data on organized crime trends at an international level, this report presents the findings of a survey of 40 selected organized criminal groups in 16 countries and one region. The survey was conducted by the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP) in an attempt to both build the knowledge base on organized crime groups, and to develop a comparative framework for the study of the phenomenon. The mechanism in which the data was collected and analyzed is explored below and the findings presented. Among other results, the data has allowed the development of a typology of organized criminal groups. Details: New York: UNODC, 2002. 123p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed June 28, 2018 at: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf Year: 2002 Country: International URL: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/publications/Pilot_survey.pdf Shelf Number: 150727 Keywords: Human SmugglingOrganized CrimeTrafficking in FirearmsTransnational Organized crime |